How Global Shifts and Energy Dependence Shape Serbia and Europe
One of the reasons behind Russia’s aggression against Ukraine was the issue of energy, specifically the transportation of Russian gas to Europe through Ukrainian territory. How significant are energy resources and natural resources as factors in conflicts and wars today?
Personally, I do not believe that the issue of gas transportation through Ukraine was a key factor in Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. Many other socio-political factors led to this outcome. By the end of 2021, Russia and Germany, with the support of several other EU countries, were completing the second branch of the Nord Stream pipeline, with a capacity of around 55 billion cubic metres of gas per year. Alongside it, Nord Stream 1 (also 55 billion cubic metres), which has been operational since 2011, and the TurkStream pipeline (with a capacity of around 31.5 billion cubic metres per year) provided more than enough capacity to replace the routes that had transported Russian gas to Europe for decades. Therefore, I am sure there was never an intention among the key stakeholders—primarily Russia and Germany—to invest in new capacities that would pass through Ukraine (the Ukrainian route) or Poland (Yamal). However, at the onset of the war in Ukraine, everything changed.
Despite this, energy sources and natural resources have been a cause of armed conflicts, either directly or indirectly, for many decades. While they may not have been the direct cause of this conflict, they have undoubtedly had the greatest impact on the energy market.
The great powers are showing significant energy weaknesses—in Germany’s industry today. What, then, should small and vulnerable countries like Serbia, whose energy dependence poses an even greater threat?
As I mentioned, Germany played an all-or-nothing game between Russia and Europe. And it lost. Had the war not broken out, Germany would have been the sole entry point for Russian gas into Europe. Both its economy and citizens would have benefited, and the competitive advantage of German industry would have been substantial. What remains unclear is why Germany did not have a backup plan. Relying on a single energy source, especially one that is not under your control, is extremely risky. At the same time, Germany shut down its nuclear power plants while restricting coal energy production. Investments in renewable energy sources did not progress as expected, and (Russian) gas was meant to be a transitional energy source. When the gas supply was cut off, Germany had no choice but to import energy from the market urgently, which was an expensive endeavour. The cost was borne by its citizens and economy. The government also paid the price.
How Much Does Our Reliance on Russia Today Stem from Our Energy Needs?
Our orientation towards Russia is primarily a result of political relations, where Russia has historically been portrayed as a “friend.” At the same time, the West has been seen as an entity seeking to exploit us. This rhetoric, to a greater or lesser extent, has been present for at least 40 years. Naturally, NATO’s bombing of Serbia without UN Security Council approval significantly contributed to this perception. All of this, along with many other factors, has led to Serbia traditionally having better relations with Russia than with the West—or at least, that is the prevailing perception.
Although this perception is not always accurate, it runs so deep that in a survey conducted a few years ago, most Serbian citizens believed Russia was the largest donor to Serbia, even though it was not even in the top ten. Therefore, I do not think that Serbia’s energy dependence on Russia is the reason for good relations; instead, it is a consequence of them.
Despite the officially proclaimed brotherly relations, there are few economic examples where this translates into tangible benefits
Why Does Serbia Pay Significantly More for Gas and Oil and Have Some of the Most Expensive Fuel in the World While Claiming Russia Is a Friendly Nation?
This brings us to one of the key questions. Despite the officially proclaimed brotherly relations, there are few economic examples where this translates into tangible benefits. There are at least two reasons for this.
First, gas prices are determined through direct negotiations with Russia, but market size also plays a crucial role. A larger market means a more significant buyer with greater negotiating power. A good example is Bulgaria, where gas prices were reduced at one point when the EU “assisted” in the negotiations.
The second reason is likely that Serbia does not buy gas directly from Russia but through an intermediary (Jugorosgas). This intermediary purchase results in someone earning a substantial commission while citizens and businesses bear the financial burden. And this has always been the practice.
The US Has Imposed Sanctions on NIS. Did Vučić Orchestrate This to Play the Victim and Justify His Distancing from Russia?
It is unclear what exactly has happened at this moment. However, the sanctions are now in place, and this situation must be resolved somehow. I do not see the government distancing itself from Russia, nor do I believe the sanctions will somehow facilitate such a move. It remains to be seen what steps the government will take to address this issue, which might give us a clearer idea of where these sanctions originated.
What Will Happen to NIS Now? The Americans Demand the Removal of the Russian Owner, While Russia Rejects Nationalisation. Has Vučić Deliberately Stepped Onto a Political Minefield?
If the sanctions remain in place and are strictly enforced, there are only two possible outcomes—either a change in ownership or bankruptcy. I do not see a third option. How the government intends to solve this problem is up to them. The situation is extremely difficult, and Serbia must maintain a delicate balance between both sides.
The primary reason for this is Serbia’s heavy dependence on Russian gas. Without that, Russia’s stance on NIS would not be of much concern to us. Moreover, the failure to implement the Agreement on Cooperation in the Oil and Gas Sector due to the cancellation of the South Stream project (one of the three projects covered by the agreement) had already created the conditions for a revision of the agreement back then. However, Serbia’s high dependence on Russian gas has put the country in a weak negotiating position.
Is Germany Putting the Greatest Pressure on Serbia Over Lithium Mining? Is this a Form of Neocolonialism, and how dangerous is it for us?
I wouldn’t say that Germany is pressuring Serbia regarding lithium mining. The government seems more likely to portray it that way to justify its agreement with Rio Tinto. After all, that government and that prime minister are no longer in office, and after the elections in Germany, we will see how the new government approaches this issue. My position is that Serbia currently has no economic and even less political interest in mining lithium.
In a global world where polarisation is stronger than ever, Europe must more than ever act as the ‘third pillar’ in a bipolar world. Otherwise, it risks disappearing as a distinct entity
European Sanctions Against Russia Were Criticised Under the Pretext That Europe Would Freeze Without Russian Gas, Yet This Has Not Happened for Three Winters. However, There Is Still a Crisis—Industry Is Struggling, Societies Are Shifting to the Right, and Popular Resistance to Neoliberalism Is Growing. How Do You See Europe’s Political Future?
For several decades now, Europe has been led by third-rate politicians. There are no leaders with vision; short-term policies have replaced long-term strategies. Everything valuable in Europe seems to have moved to the corporate sector, while those left in politics are incapable of leading Europe forward. This is evident in every aspect—from delays in global policies and innovation to undefined relations with China and Russia, strained ties with the US, and Brexit.
All of this endangers the vision of Europe as the best place to live in the world. In my view, the social democratic model of governance, where the state takes care of all its citizens, remains the best one. However, the failure of European social democracy—and even the centre-right—to respond to modern challenges has driven people towards political extremes, whether left or right. History seems to repeat itself, which is never good for Europe—or us.
In a global world where polarisation is stronger than ever, where the West is losing its position as the “bastion of democracy,” where liberalisation is being replaced by protectionism, and where the UN and the Security Council no longer have the mechanisms to maintain peace, Europe must more than ever act as the “third pillar” in a bipolar world. Otherwise, it risks disappearing as a distinct entity.